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Abstract 
 
Among the explanations for state ratification of human rights treaties, few are more common and 
widely accepted than the conjecture that states are rewarded for ratification by other states.  These 
rewards are expected to come in the form of tangible benefits – foreign aid, trade, and investment – and 
intangible benefits such as praise, acceptance, and legitimacy.  Surprisingly, these explanations for 
ratification have never been tested empirically.  We summarize and clarify the theoretical underpinnings 
of ―reward-for-ratification‖ theories and test these propositions empirically by looking for increased 
international financial flows and public praise and recognition following ratification of four prominent 
human rights treaties.  We find almost no evidence that states can expect increased tangible or intangible 
rewards after ratification.  Given the lack of empirical support, explanations rooted in domestic politics 
seem a more appealing alternative for understanding human rights treaty ratification. 
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Few trends in international law and international relations are as curious as the well-documented 
trend for independent states to agree to allow the international community to pass judgment on their 
internal human rights practices.  More than 45 human rights treaties concluded since the Second World 
War now recognize in effect the legitimacy of external actors’ concerns about domestic rights practices 
(Simmons 2009). The ―accountability revolution‖ in human rights has been noted by a number of authors 
to be one of the most significant trends in international law and international affairs in the past half-
century (Clark 2001; Ignatieff 2001). 
From traditional theoretical perspectives, state accession to the ―rights revolution‖ is indeed 
puzzling.  Why should sovereign states agree to make an internal issue subject to international standards 
and external review?  How can we understand the apparently voluntary decision to ratify international 
human rights agreements that create legal obligations to protect and provide for the human rights of one’s 
nationals?  Scholars have proposed three kinds of answers.  The first downplays the significance of the 
international human rights regime as meaningless because it is largely unenforceable (Krasner 1999; 
Krasner and Frotas 1998).   A second approach acknowledges that international treaty commitments are 
potentially costly because they may create pressures for adjustments in policies and practices.  These 
scholars often attribute ratification to the desire to attract some kind of material payoff: because these 
agreements compromise sovereignty, there must be some kind of reward as a matter of implicit or even 
explicit quid pro quo.  A final approach is to attribute ratification to intangible benefits.  Belonging, 
praise, acceptance, respect, inclusion – these signs of social approval are at the heart of the ratification 
decision for ideational theorists working in a more sociological vein.  Governments ratify human rights 
agreements, in this view, not because they are remunerative in a material sense, but because ratification 
ushers a state into the circles of the most respected countries in the world. 
Surprisingly, none of these explanations has undergone serious empirical scrutiny.  To do so is 
the main purpose of this study.  We ask, does ratification actually lead to the consequences said to 
motivate the behavior in the first place?  At first blush it may seem as though we are explaining a decision 
by its outcome, but this is an entirely legitimate approach in this case.  If states did not anticipate positive 
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consequences, as these theories suggest, they would have little motivation to ratify. Their anticipation 
must be correct on average, or else most governments would update their expectations about the 
advantages that ratification brings. If we observe payoffs (tangible or intangible) to ratification, there is a 
strong prima facie case for a reward-based ratification motive.  But if no such relationship can be found, 
we may have to look elsewhere for a theory of commitment to international human rights standards. 
This article proceeds as follows.  In the first section, we review the prevalent theoretical 
approaches to analyzing the puzzle of human rights treaty ratification.  The second section discusses what 
we should expect to observe empirically if ―quid-pro-quo‖ theories of ratification are useful.  The third 
section discusses the data and methods, and the fourth section presents the results.  In the conclusion, we 
suggest alternative ways to think about the ratification decision.  We argue that it is likely that most 
countries ratify treaties not for what they expect to gain from outsiders, but for domestic political 
purposes.  Strategic ratification certainly can happen, but it rarely yields the rewards some people seem to 
assume. 
 
I.  Human Rights and International Relations: The Ratification Puzzle 
There are many ways to think about the influences on governments’ commitments to international 
human rights treaties.  One is to think of a treaty commitment as a low-cost opportunity to express 
support for a cooperative international endeavor. Hathaway has proposed that governments ratify treaties 
because they allow a costless expression of support for the principles they contain. Those who ratify reap 
―expressive‖ benefits, that is, ―rewards for positions rather than for effects’‖ (Hathaway 2002).  Because 
human rights agreements are not effectively monitored, ―the expressive benefits that countries gain from 
the act of joining the treaty will be enjoyed…regardless of whether they actually comply with the treaty’s 
requirements‖ (Hathaway 2002).  In this view, international legal arrangements are weak, enforcement is 
unlikely, and costs of non-compliance are low.  Why not ratify, and gain some support or at least praise 
from the international community for doing so?  The act of ratification, in this view, is driven by the 
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potential benefits of signing an agreement that goes unmonitored. Two kinds of benefits are often asserted 
to be available: tangible economic benefits and intangible social ―legitimation.‖  Together, we refer to 
these types of approaches as rewards theory. 
 
Tangible rewards 
In some accounts, the benefits governments expect when they commit themselves to international 
human rights standards are blatantly mercenary. Hathaway is clear about the tangible nature of the quid-
pro-quo:  
Simply put, states join treaties like the Convention against Torture [CAT] in no small part 
to make themselves look good.  In so doing, they may hope to attract more foreign 
investment, aid donations, international trade, and other tangible benefits
 
(Hathaway 
2004). 
 
Economic benefits are among the ―collateral [non-legal] consequences‖ of human rights treaty 
ratification, according to Hathaway (2007).
 
 
Similar propositions abound in the literature.  Hawkins and Goodliffe explain  ratification of the 
CAT by arguing that ―other states and third party actors (corporations and NGOs) reward that state 
through investment, trade, aid and positive political relationships‖ (Hawkins and Goodliffe 2006).  
Boockman asserts that international aid could influence the decision to ratify International Labor 
Organization (ILO) conventions (Boockmann 2001).  Posner (2008, 1769) lists ―pressure from western 
states that tied aid and other benefits (such as EU membership) to treaty ratification‖ as the first reason 
developing states ratify human rights treaties.  And Trachtman (forthcoming 2012) finds other 
explanations for treaty ratification ―less plausible‖ than a quid pro quo logic of rewards.  
Moreover, despite recognition that the multilateral aid organizations such as the World Bank do not 
explicitly link their assistance to human rights treaty ratification, the idea persists in the literature that 
―International organizations also encourage ratification by linking a treaty with material goals, such as 
economic aid‖ (Oberdörster 2008).  
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The idea that human rights policies are enforced by the manipulation of rewards and punishments 
is hardly universally accepted.  Realists assert that governments are not generally willing to expend 
significant resources on foreign human rights practices at all. (Goldsmith and Posner 2000).   But even if 
states were inclined to enforce foreign citizens’ rights, why would treaty ratification be a credible signal 
of states’ intentions to comply with international norms of human rights protections?  It is not uncommon 
for international legal theorists to assert the critical role of treaty ratification as an expression of a serious 
intent on the part of states to behave as the ratified treaty requires.  Guzman, for example, argues (though 
not specifically in the context of human rights) that treaties involve ―the complete pledge of a nation's 
reputational capital‖ (Guzman 2002)  and as such can sometimes constitute a credible commitment on the 
part of states to comply with their provisions.  But in the absence of reciprocity – notably lacking in the 
human rights area – there is no clear reason for such an essentially unenforceable pledge to put much at 
stake. The puzzle deepens if we buy the common observation that treaties do little to persuade the worst 
right offenders to improve their policies (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). 
Perhaps the answer to the credibility conundrum – why should government or economic agents be 
impressed with treaty ratification? – lies in the type of agreements that states choose to ratify.  Smith 
argues that during especially hard economic times, states consciously join enforceable human rights 
agreements, such as the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which gives individuals the right to complain of a treaty violation to the Human Rights 
Committee, or the making of an Article 22 Declaration regarding the CAT, which provides individuals 
similar standing before the Committee Against Torture (Smith forthcoming).  She argues that ratification 
of enforceable agreements is an opportunity for states to collect aid from donors that may care about 
human rights.  Such a commitment could also (in theory) convince private investors and traders that the 
ratifying government has long time horizons, and that the government may forego opportunistic policies 
such as ―takings‖ that degrade the value of an investment. While this approach addresses the theoretical 
puzzle of how states might be able to signal their credibility, it again relies on the untested assumption 
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that other states and non-state actors will in fact reward ―costly‖ treaty commitments with various forms 
of economic largesse.  
To clarify, we do not doubt that some countries and organizations use economic leverage to 
encourage states to improve their human rights behavior and to encourage the consolidation of democratic 
institutions.  The European Union and NATO may sometimes employ various forms of conditionality in 
this way (Hawkins 2004; Kelley 2004; Sanahuja 2000).   However, careful studies of the use of the 
European Union’s ―conditionality clause‖ reveal not one instance of invocation due to refusal to ratify a 
human rights treaty (Moberg 2009).   Furthermore, while there may be very good theoretical reasons to 
expect that the actual protection of rights in domestic law and practice does constitute a costly signal of 
governments’ intentions (Farber 2002),  we are skeptical that states and commercial interests reward 
ratification per se. Aid donors typically monitor their recipients and have been known to change their 
giving to reward not ratification, but actual policy changes (Alston and Crawford 2000; Nielsen 2008).  
For example, in 1975, the US Congress passed legislation prohibiting the extension of foreign economic 
assistance to countries with severe human rights violations.  But rather than relying on the ―signal‖ sent 
by treaty ratification, Congress commissioned detailed human rights reports for each potential aid 
recipient, suggesting that donors find it worth their while to collect information on actual human rights 
practices when they make their aid decisions. 
 In short, the current literature largely assumes – on wobbly theoretical grounds and without 
empirical support – that governments ratify human rights agreements because they expect some kind of 
material rewards, whether official aid, liberalized trade, or private investment.  Practically nothing is said 
about when such rewards are doled out: As an inducement or capacity-building effort prior to ratification, 
as the ―management school‖ of compliance might suggest (Chayes and Chayes 1993)?  As a post hoc 
reward for having ratified a key treaty?  Rewards theorists are even less definitive about who is 
responsible for making decisions about tangible rewards; indeed, there is practically no attention given to 
the varying motives of governments versus principled NGOs versus profit-seeking private actors.  Still, 
the tangible rewards assumption is so pervasive that it merits close empirical scrutiny, if for no other 
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reason than to encourage social scientists to develop better explanations for the legalization of human 
rights over the past five decades.  
 
Intangible Rewards 
A second set of explanations for human rights treaty ratification stresses the importance 
governments attach to the approval of the international community as a motivation to ratify human rights 
agreements.  Less crass than a ratification-for-cash model, ratification is widely seen especially by 
sociologists and political scientists working in a constructivist vein as an expression of the desire to 
―belong‖ as a ―member in good standing‖ to the international community of ―modern‖ nations.   
Sociological theories tend to emphasize the collective legitimating function of international legal 
agreements, especially in the human rights area.   ―International law and international organizations are 
still the primary vehicles for stating community norms and for collective legitimation,‖ according to a 
classic study on international human rights norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999).  Governments have been 
―socialized‖ to care about what other states think of them, which might explain variance in ratification 
across countries and regions of the world (Lutz and Sikkink 2000). International law plays a central role 
in this theory of state action. Landman (2005) refers to the ratification of human rights treaties as a 
―socially embedded unit act‖  implying that the act has meaning largely because of the value assigned to it 
by the international community of nations. The value the international community places on these 
agreements generates subtle pressures to ratify. 
Some scholars believe that participating in the social act of treaty ratification imparts a degree of 
legitimacy to the government and/or the state taking that action.  Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui for example 
note the ―strong pressures to ratify international human rights treaties‖ and assert that ―ratification puts a 
legitimate face on the government…‖ (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).  This need for legitimacy, 
coupled with awareness that commitment to the regime is seldom costly in practice, is said to produce 
radical decoupling between policy decisions to ratify and actual human rights behaviors.  Landman 
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(2005) similarly refers to the need of new ―fourth wave‖ democracies to garner international legitimacy, 
and cites this need as a reason for human rights treaty ratification. 
Closely related to the social meaning of human rights treaty ratification is the desire of states to 
avoid criticism.  Avoidance of criticism is not merely instrumental; ideational theories emphasize that it is 
coupled with state self-perceptions of identity. Hawkins explains states’ shifting positions on the 
universal jurisdiction provisions of the CAT as a reflection of efforts to ―avoid positions in which they 
would stand alone against other states, especially those with similar identities‖ (Hawkins 2004, 793).  
Hawkins’ interview with Hans Danelius, a Swedish foreign ministry official who was intimately involved 
in the negotiations reveals that concern about shaming was a primary motivation for the growing 
homogeneity of opinion in support of universal jurisdiction.  Simmons suggests that the desire to avoid 
criticism may motivate some ―insincere‖ states to ratify human rights agreements, but that this is a 
strategy that makes sense only in the short run and only when relatively little information is available on 
actual practices (Simmons 2009).  States sometimes also respond to naming and shaming by attempting to 
neutralize its effectiveness.  Engleheart (Engleheart 2003, 44) identifies the 1993 Bangkok Declaration as 
an exercise of international solidarity representing a ―serious attempt to shift international human rights 
norms, in order to weaken the strategy of shaming.‖  From a constructivist perspective, shaming can 
represent a real cost to states that seek acceptance by international society, with praise representing the 
opposite side of the same coin. 
Seeking to understand how human rights norms and identities spread internationally, sociologists 
have applied the concept of ―World Culture‖ to capture the idea that values, norms, and ideas of what 
constitutes proper behavior of a modern state diffuse in varying degrees globally.  One way to interpret 
patterns of treaty ratification is to situate states in a global macrosociological context, and view 
ratification as one instantiation of a diffusing logic of appropriateness that encourages governments to 
want to present themselves to the broader international community and to their own citizens as actors that 
affirm the basic rights of individuals.  Ratification in this context can be thought of as an act of emulation, 
in which states ―enact‖ the values of a broader western progressive culture, in an effort formally to 
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identify themselves as members in ―good standing‖ of the modern society of states (Meyer et al. 1997).  
In the case of human rights treaty ratification these standards of good standing are transmitted via 
international conferences, organizations, and the signals sent by the ratifications of peers (Berkovitch 
1999; Boli and Thomas 1999).  Treaty ratification is one way to enact the ―script‖ of modernity in this 
view (Wotipka and Ramirez 2008), rendered more likely when the nation-state is embedded in the 
structures of international society.  But to the extent that ratification is mere enactment of these external 
scripts of modernity, it represents nothing more than ―isomorphism‖ – or the adoption of superficially 
similar formal policies without their internalization.  
While these various ideational mechanisms are very different – shaming and persuasion imply 
active policies on the part of pro-rights agents, while theories that point to the mere availability of modern 
scripts view core states as more passive – all suggest there are intangible external pressures for treaty 
ratification. And yet the logic of ratifying in order to glean external social approval is questionable. Social 
approval might be a plausible explanation for ratification if no one cares to follow up, but this explanation 
seems a poor fit for a world in which citizens, other governments, and assorted transnational advocacy 
groups value actual practices over mere ratification and have reasonably good information on the former. 
There seems to be an obvious internal contradiction in the claim that ―Repressive states want the 
legitimacy that the human rights treaties confer on them more than non-repressive states because they are 
under tighter scrutiny for their practices‖ (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008).  It is far from clear 
how treaty ratification alone grants ―legitimacy‖ if observers are scrutinizing state behavior (Goodman 
and Jinks 2003).
 
 
 
Rewards theory and the empirical puzzle of ratification 
Rewards theory suffers on logical grounds, but has a hard time explaining empirical realities as 
well.  If treaty ratification is universally costless (or even profitable?), then ratification of human rights 
accords should have been immediate and universal.  Instead, it took ten years for the requisite thirty-five 
countries to ratify the ICCPR to bring it into force, and thirty-five years later, accession is still not 
 
11 
 
universal.   The CAT has gleaned relatively few state parties: only slightly over half of the countries in the 
world ratified in the first twenty years it was open for ratification.  With the possible exception of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (which has weak enforcement provisions and many aspirational 
obligations), not all governments have been in a rush to express even symbolic support for the six core 
human rights treaties.
1
 
Of course these ratification patterns are only circumstantial evidence that rewards rarely motivate 
ratification of international human rights treaties.  In the sections that follow, we ask whether rewards are 
actually forthcoming when ratification takes place.  If not, we believe it is time to search for new 
explanations for why governments have committed themselves voluntarily to international legal 
commitments to respect the rights of their own people.  
 
II.  Hypotheses: Testing the Claims of Rewards for Ratification 
Rewards theory posits that human rights treaty ratification is done in response to or in 
anticipation of external incentives, both tangible and intangible, leading us to test the following 
hypotheses.   
Bilateral foreign aid – the most easily manipulable form of reward for ratification – should 
increase with ratification or slightly prior, if it is being offered by foreign governments as an inducement 
to ratify.  We would expect the strongest increases from governments that place the highest premium on 
treaty ratification: governments which themselves have already ratified. 
Trade and investment are not as easy for market-oriented governments to manipulate in response 
to treaty ratification.  To our knowledge, lack of international human rights treaty ratification has never 
been the primary motive for a sanctioning episode.  We therefore expect that the rewards to ratification do 
not primarily flow from government policies, but rather from the decisions of private actors when they 
see a government ratify an agreement.  The likely mechanism in this case is the signaling function that 
                                                 
1
  For a detailed look at the Kaplan-Meier survival functions for ratification of each treaty, see [author’s website] 
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ratification may entail: ratification signals to private agents that the government has a reasonably long 
time horizon and is likely to treat foreign economic investments – like its own people – with reasonable 
respect (Farber 2002).  If this is the case, we are not very likely to see anticipatory economic investments; 
indeed, there could be quite a delay between ratification and a noticeable upswing in foreign economic 
―rewards.‖ A plausible hypothesis therefore is that ratification is followed by increased foreign 
investment and trade flows in the medium term; for example, within one to three years. Note also that if 
ratification sends a credible signal about time horizons to economic agents, the national source of trade or 
investment should not matter.  In principle, economic agents from any part of the world can see and 
interpret ratification as indicative of a government willing to forego opportunistic gains in the short run 
for longer term payoffs. 
Our second (and more challenging) empirical task is to test the claim that governments ratify 
human rights treaties for the intangible rewards – external acceptance or approval and the sense of 
legitimacy or belonging that it may impart to the ratifying nation. Essentially, this is a claim about 
something utterly unobservable: the psychological boost a set of policymakers experience when they feel 
they have done something that meets with the approval of external actors whose approval they value.  
This kind of reward is internally experienced, and we cannot in this paper directly evaluate the claim 
made by world society theorists that enacting modernity offers such psychic rewards.  But we can at least 
provide a systematic empirical test of the proposition that governments ratify human rights agreements in 
order to gain external approval or praise – outcomes we would understand as constituting ―expressive 
benefits‖ in Hathaway’s words, or ―social coercion‖ in Goodman and Jinks’ formulation.   
If external approval is an important motivation, then it should be possible to connect ratification 
with some form of public praise from important global actors: for example, the European Union, the 
United States, and the most visible non-state human rights organization, Amnesty International.  Public 
references to the government’s ratification should be more likely and more positive if the external actor 
itself has ratified the treaty in question.  Finally, public references should be more likely and more 
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positive when the treaty in question constitutes a credible commitment; that is, when it is non-derogable 
and to some degree enforceable. 
 
III.  Data and Methods 
Measuring Treaty Ratification 
Although the rewards-for-ratification argument is often loosely applied to all human rights 
treaties, we focus on the easiest cases for the theory:  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)
2
, the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(OP 1)
3
, The Convention Against Torture (CAT)
 4
, and the optional 22
nd
 Article of the Convention Against 
Torture (Art. 22).   The two treaties and two optional obligations we have chosen are four of the most 
significant international human rights agreements in existence and form the core of the voluntary 
multilateral legal apparatus protecting personal integrity, civil, and political rights. If rewards do not 
follow ratification of these key treaties, it is doubtful that there are rewards for ratifying other human 
rights agreements such as the largely hortatory Convention on the Rights of the Child or the new 
Disabilities Convention.  Additionally, the treaties we examine display variance on the credibility of 
commitments.  Ratifying the ICCPR and CAT may be cheap talk but the ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 and 
CAT Article 22 tie a state to external oversight of particular cases by allowing individuals from ratifying 
states to report human rights abuses directly to the respective treaty oversight committee. Presumably, this 
creates a higher probability that violations will be noticed, condemned or possibly sanctioned. 
We consider each time that a state ratifies any one of these four treaties to be a ratification 
episode.  Rewards theory is vague about the timing of rewards, so we look for rewards in the year of, and 
up to five years after ratification.  We compare these ratification episodes to identically sized historical 
periods from countries that have not (yet) ratified a particular human rights treaty.  For example, Bolivia 
                                                 
2
 Text of the ICCPR can be found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (Accessed 16 December 2011). 
3
 Text of the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol can be found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr-one.htm 
(Accessed 16 December 2011). 
4
  Text of the CAT can be found at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm. (Accessed 16 December 2011). 
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did not ratify the CAT between 1985 and 1995, making Bolivia-1990 (the focal year is 1990) an episode 
of non-ratification that we can compare to episodes of ratification.  Non-ratification episodes may 
overlap – Bolivia also did not ratify the CAT between 1986 and 1996 which we consider to be another 
ratification episode.  We account for the non-independence of these overlapping non-ratification episodes 
in our statistical models by using country-level random effects and clustered errors.  Ratification episodes 
may come from the earlier history of countries that eventually ratify a treaty – Bolivia eventually ratified 
the CAT in 1998 – but we do not allow ratification episodes and non-ratification episodes to overlap. 
Episodes of treaty ratification are likely to be different from many of the episodes of non-
ratification, presenting potential problems of selection bias.  For example, we find that in the five years 
prior to ratification of the CAT, states had higher GDP, trade flows, and political freedoms, and lower aid 
flows, relative to states that did not subsequently ratify.  If these differences are also associated with the 
hypothesized rewards, then direct comparison of ratification and non-ratification episodes will lead to 
biased estimates of the effect of ratification unless we make adjustments for these differences.  We 
address this problem by first pre-processing the data using matching (Ho et al. 2007), which results in a 
matched sample in which the ratification- and non-ratification episodes are comparable.
5
  We then use 
standard regression techniques to compare similar ratification and non-ratification episodes, controlling 
for the observed differences in the relevant control variables in each of the five year periods prior to 
ratification (or non-ratification, in the case of non-ratification episodes).
6
  Because we have repeated 
episodes of non-ratification from the same countries, we use a hierarchical model with country-level 
random effects and clustered standard errors to account for unobserved similarities that are constant 
within countries across time.  Throughout, we control for actual human rights practices to test the 
                                                 
5
  Our specific matching procedure uses the Mahalanobis distance metric defined using the pre-ratification 
covariates such that units that are close together have similar values of these covariates (Rubin 1980).  We define a 
caliper – the maximum allowable Mahalanobis distance between matched episodes of ratification and non-
ratification.  Then, for each ratification episode, we retain all of the non-ratification episodes that fall within this 
caliper.  Non-ratification episodes that are not close enough to any of the ratification episodes are discarded to avoid 
the potentially serious model dependence that would result from including these very dissimilar units.   
6
 The results are similar when we use regression without matching.  We believe the matching results to be more 
credible because they rely less on un-testable modeling assumptions see for example  
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proposition that ratification alone elicits rewards from the international community.  Data on violations 
of physical integrity rights come from Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
If treaty ratification is a significant predictor of increased rewards in the five years following 
ratification, using the standard 95 percent cut-off in a two-tailed test, we conclude that the hypothesis is 
supported.  Well-known statistical results on multiple testing imply that our actual level of statistical 
confidence across multiple models will be lower than 95 percent; but as we will see, we are generally 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that there are no rewards for ratification, even at this lower level of 
implied confidence. 
 
Measuring Tangible Rewards 
Foreign Aid:  We measure foreign aid using logged per capita bilateral aid flows from western 
donors to 120 developing countries between 1981 and 2004 (OECD 2008).  Our coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities—percentage changes in the flow of aid in response to ratification and other 
variables.   
We include a number of standard control variables drawn from the literature on aid flows.  As 
measures of recipient need, we use GDP per capita and GDP per capita
2
, as well as Population and 
Population
2
.  Donors’ strategic interests are widely found to influence aid flows, so we include Trade and 
Trade
2
, Formal Alliances and Donor Forces stationed in the recipient, an indicator for whether a 
recipient is a former Colony of an aid donor, an indicator for Socialist states, an indicator for years of the 
Cold War, as well as the multiplicative interaction of Socialist*Cold War, whether a recipient is involved 
in an interstate or civil War, and indicator variables for the US-Egypt and US-Israel dyads to account for 
the special aid relationships there.  Foreign aid flows may be influenced by bureaucratic inertia (Carey 
2007), and so we include Aid receipts (t-1) and the total amount of aid given worldwide by each donor. 
Trade: To estimate trade rewards, we turn to a dyadic dataset of import flows and use a 
modification of the well-known gravity model (see Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007),  adding treaty 
ratification as an independent variable.  We measure trade as the natural log of imports from the first 
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country in each directed dyad to the second country.  Control variables include WTO participation (an 
indicator for dyads with Both formal GATT/WTO members, and a separate indicator for dyads with Only 
one formal GATT/WTO member), other types of trade agreements, including Reciprocal and Non-
reciprocal PTAs, an indicator for dyads where trade is subject to the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), dyads that have a Currency Union, and dyads that are in the same Colonial Orbit.  Finally, we 
include a variety of cultural and geographic control variables: Distance, an indicator for countries that 
have a Shared Border, counts of the number of Landlocked or Island states in each dyad, an indicator of 
Common Language between dyad pairs, and the natural log of the product of the Land Areas between 
paired countries. 
Foreign Direct Investment: We test for investment rewards using a dataset of (logged) FDI 
inflows between 1980 and 2000.  Taking standard controls from the FDI literature (Blanton and Blanton 
2007; Li and Resnick 2003), we include measures of market size and potential for market growth, namely 
Trade, GDP per capita, GDP per capita
2
 and GDP growth.  We also include measures of financial 
stability such as Exchange Rate Volatility averaged over 1980-2000 and Inflation measured using the 
GDP deflator for each country and year.  Because political openness and stability may matter for foreign 
investors (Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003), we control for Democracy and Regime Durability (defined 
as the length of time since a major change in the democracy scores). 
 
Measuring Intangible Rewards 
We measure incidents of praise and criticism using data from newly collected and previously 
existing text resources representing the views of the European Union, the United States, and Amnesty 
International.  We collected 34,335 European Union press releases – more than three a day on average – 
published between 1985 and 2010 on the full range of political topics engaged by the European Union.  If 
praise occurs, we expect it to be evident in these press releases, since the European Union has led the 
way in the international human rights regime, has significant economic and political might, and 
(arguably) forms the core of the international community of law-abiding states. 
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Because praise is more immediate and short-lived than flows of aid or trade, we keep the 
ratification episode framework introduced above, but shorten the period to include the 365 days prior to 
and the 365 following the exact ratification date.  To measure praise in EU press releases, we first 
identify each episode of ratification and then examine (1) the existence of explicit praise, (2) positive 
versus negative language and (3) reference to official state visits.   
Although the EU is the most likely source of intangible positive reinforcement, we also consider 
the possibility that states could be ratifying to seek praise from the United States.  We obtained the US 
State Department Daily Press Briefings between January 2, 1991 and December 23, 2008, for a total of 
3,625 briefings. These cover US responses to recent international events, US policy in relation to foreign 
countries, and US actions abroad.
7
  We analyze these briefings in the same ways as the EU press releases: 
first searching for explicit praise for ratification, and then attempting to identify shifts in the tone of 
speech surrounding references to ratifying countries as well as evidence of increases in official visits with 
recent ratifiers. 
Finally, we use data on criticism by Amnesty International collected by Ron et al (2005) to test 
whether ratification of human rights treaties mutes criticism by non-state actors.  Rather than using the 
full text of Amnesty International’s reports, we estimate models predicting the number of critical reports 
about a particular country released in a given year, using a set of variables collected and used by Ron et 
al.  To these variables we add variables coding whether each country ratified a human rights agreement in 
the current year to see whether this predicts lower criticism by Amnesty. 
 
IV. Findings 
Tangible Rewards 
 Overall, our findings offer virtually no support for the hypothesis that tangible rewards accrue to 
states that ratify human rights treaties.  In Table 1, we report the coefficients on the key variable of 
                                                 
7
 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/.  (Accessed 10 January 2012.) 
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interest: ratification of the four key human rights treaties.  Our focus is on causal estimates of the effect of 
treaty ratification, so other coefficients are omitted from the table.  This brevity is not a loss – the other 
coefficients are generally not amenable to causal interpretation, especially after our matching procedure.   
 
Outcome Variable Foreign Aid 
    Model 1      Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
Treaty     ICCPR         OP 1        CAT       Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
       13.9 
      (15.0) 
        -5.4 
        (8.9) 
          .8 
     (23.2) 
           .1 
      (10.8) 
     
N ratification episodes        31        36       30        11 
N non-ratification episodes      280      675     291      541 
R-squared         0.82          0.66         0.71          0.61 
Matching     Yes      Yes     Yes      Yes 
Controls  Physical integrity rights, political rights, foreign aid from all donors, 
foreign aid from donors that are signatories to the treaty, GDP p.c., GDP 
p.c.
2
, population, population
2
, colonial relationships, alliances with aid 
donors, an indicator for the Cold War, and an indicator for ongoing war.  
The models include one- through five-year lags of each of the time-
varying variables. 
 
Table 1:  Linear regression of aid flows on treaty ratification with standard errors clustered by country 
and country random effects.  The unit of observation is the (non-)ratification episode, with ratification 
occurring in year t, the covariates measured in the years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5.  The outcome variable is 
total receipts of foreign aid from donors who have ratified the relevant treaty in years t through t+5. 
 
 We find that ratification of four human rights treaties has no effect on the average level of aid that 
countries receive in the year of ratification and the five years following.  The estimated gains in aid from 
ratifying the ICCPR, its Optional Protocol 1, the CAT, and Article 22 are generally small and in all cases 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  These null results are robust.  We were unable to coerce a 
stronger result by logging the outcome variable, using a Tobit specification, using fewer lags on the 
control variables, looking at aid from all donors (not just those that have ratified the same agreement), and 
omitting the matching.    
These findings on the weak relationship between ratification and official aid comport with 
qualitative interview evidence.  When asked specifically whether treaty ratification influences aid 
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decisions, knowledgeable European decision makers answer unambiguously in the negative.  Norwegian 
officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs working at the intersection of human rights and development 
assistance were quite clear in denying that aid policies had any linkages with a country’s status as a party 
to any human rights treaties.
8
  Development aid was described as being on a ―different track,‖ and while 
they often discussed human rights with officials from recipient states, aid was never conditional on treaty 
ratification. Similarly, an official from the German Foreign Ministry who headed the Human Rights 
Department from 2003 to 2008 indicated that while German policy did emphasize human rights, there 
was no aid conditionality relating to ratification of treaties.   He noted that ―ratification of hr [human 
rights] treaties is one thing, the strict (or even not so strict) observance of the respective treaties' 
provisions is a completely different one…‖  Furthermore, ―coercion and clear pressure - at least with the 
means at our disposal - generally doesn't have the desired effect in the country at hand but rather satisfies 
our own public's needs' (including those of NGOs).‖
9
  For these reasons, Germany urges ratification but 
does not make a link between ratification and aid.  The aid-for-ratification story is neither supported by 
the statistical evidence, nor does it ring true for practitioners in a position to know. 
 Turning to trade, we find results that sharply contradict rewards theory: states could be losing 
trade after ratifying some human rights treaties.  Table 2 shows the results of four models predicting the 
imports to OECD countries from non-OECD countries.  Countries that ratify Optional Protocol 1 seem to 
be losing roughly 24 percent of trade over the next six years relative to similar countries that haven’t 
ratified this optional clause, and this effect is highly statistically significant.
10
   Ratification of the ICCPR, 
CAT and Article 22 also seem to lead to slight decreases in trade on average, but these estimates are not 
significantly different from zero.  We were unable to coax a positive, significant result out of any of these 
                                                 
8
   Interviews at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 6 August 2009.  Officials interviewed: Anne Marchant, 
Ambassador, Human Rights Issues, Section for Human Rights and Democracy, and Geir Løkken, Assistant Director 
General, Minister of International Development’s Policy Analysis Unit. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. 
9
 Interview with Peter Rothen, Head of the German Foreign Office’s Human Rights Department 2003-2008; via e-
mail correspondence; 11 August 2009.  
10
 Recalling that the outcome variable is logged trade, we coefficients are best interpreted as percentage changes in 
trade as a result of a unit increase (elasticities).  For indicator variables like treaty ratification, this calculations is 
100*(exp(β) - 1), or 100*(exp(-.28) - 1) = -24 in this case. 
 
20 
 
models even after a variety of changes.  A number of reasonable alternative specifications even resulted 
in stronger negative results: most notably when we only use 3 years of lags for the control variables 
(instead of 5) and/or shorten the rewards period to three years after ratification. 
 
Outcome Variable Trade Imports between Dyads 
    Model 5      Model 6     Model 7     Model 8 
Treaty     ICCPR         OP 1        CAT       Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
        -.12
 
        (.08) 
         -.28* 
         (.07) 
        -.025   
        (.057) 
         -.007 
         (.13) 
     
N ratification episodes     245      194     458        87 
N non-ratification episodes     264      185     573      235 
R-squared         0.94          0.92         0.91          0.90 
Matching     Yes      Yes     Yes      Yes 
Controls  Dyadic distance, past dyadic imports, source country physical integrity 
rights, source country political rights, GATT membership, preferential 
trade agreements, GSP programs, GDP, land area, and indicators for 
shared language, shared borders, landlocked states, and islands.  The 
models include one- through five-year lags of each of the time-varying 
variables. 
 
Table 2:  Linear regression of trade imports from non-OECD countries to OECD countries on treaty 
ratification with standard errors clustered by country and country random effects.  The unit of observation 
is the (non-)ratification episode dyad, with ratification occurring in year t, the covariates measured in the 
years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5.  The outcome variable is total imports from non-OECD countries to OECD 
countries that have ratified the relevant treaty in years t through t+5. * indicates p < 0.05. 
 
As with aid and trade, we find little support for the hypothesis that FDI inflows increase in the 
wake of human rights treaty ratification.  Ratification is a statistically insignificant predictor of FDI flows 
in all of the models we estimate and this null finding is robust to a variety of possible specifications of 
FDI including logged inflows (shown in Table 3), inflows over GDP, and raw inflows.  Although the 
estimated effect sizes are large – for example, we find a roughly a 39 percent reduction in FDI inflows 
attributable to ICCPR ratification in the following six years – they are each estimated extremely 
imprecisely such that the truth could in fact be a zero effect for each. 
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Outcome Variable Logged FDI inflows 
    Model 9     Model 10     Model 11     Model 12 
Treaty     ICCPR        OP 1        CAT       Art. 22 
Effect of Ratification 
(Clustered standard error) 
         -.49 
       (1.66) 
-.75 
(1.18) 
.38 
(.75) 
-.14  
(.41) 
     
N ratification episodes       22 22 36 10 
N non-ratification episodes     172 441 389 658 
R-squared         0.66 0.60 0.46 0.57 
Matching     Yes      Yes     Yes      Yes 
Controls  Past FDI, physical integrity rights, political rights, Democracy, log GDP 
p.c., log GDP p.c.
2
, GDP growth, regime durability, exchange rate 
variability, inflation, and logged trade flows.  The models include one- 
through five-year lags of each of the time-varying variables. 
 
Table 3:  Linear regression of  FDI inflows (per GDP) on treaty ratification with standard errors clustered 
by country and country random effects.  The unit of observation is the (non-)ratification episode, with 
ratification occurring in year t, the covariates measured in the years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, and t-5.  The outcome 
variable is total inflows of FDI as a fraction of GDP in years t through t+5. 
 
Bringing these models together, we find virtually no evidence to support the continued assertion 
in the literature and popular press that human rights treaty ratification is primarily the result of tangible 
sticks and carrots from states that support global adoption of human rights commitments.  If tangible 
rewards exist, they do not seem to be operating through the channels posited as most likely by rewards 
theorists – aid, trade, and FDI.  If, as we expect, tangible rewards do not exist, then rewards theory is in 
the difficult position of arguing that leaders of states routinely over-estimate the rewards that they will 
receive for ratifying human rights treaties. 
 
Intangible Rewards 
We now turn to the evidence for and against the widespread use of intangible benefits such as 
praise, acceptance, and reduced criticism to encourage ratification.  We find some evidence of intangible 
benefits in the form of direct statements by the European Union praising the accession of states into 
human rights treaties.  For example, a 2005 EU press release on the occasion of the eighth United Nations 
International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, mentions that the 
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EU welcomes the ratification of UNCAT during the course of the last year by Liberia, 
Mauritania and the Syrian Arab Republic; and the ratification of OPCAT by Argentina, 
Croatia, Liberia, Mali and Mexico.
11
 
 
Similar statements were made on the anniversary of this event in 2007 and 2009, recognizing in total 
three CAT ratifications and twenty-one ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the CAT in similar 
summary fashion. 
A very small number of countries receive more individualized and specific praise.   On February 
16, 2009, the EU issued a press release which states: 
The EU welcomes Azerbaijan's ratification of the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Convention against Torture…on 28 January 2009.   The EU encourages Azerbaijan to 
take early steps towards implementing its obligations under the Optional Protocol by 
establishing a National Preventative Mechanism and cooperating with the Subcommittee 
on Prevention.
12
 
 
To explore the prevalence of similar statements, we searched the 34,335 press releases to identify 
all examples of praise – defined as a statement displaying positive sentiment by the EU in specific 
reference to the ratification, accession, or implementation of an international human rights agreement (not 
limited to the four we focus on) by a specific country.
13
  In total, we found just eleven examples of praise-
for-ratification in which the EU spent an entire press release praising ratification by a particular state and 
five additional cases of praise in which ratifications were noted in serial fashion as part of a larger press 
release.
14
   
                                                 
11
 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/05/62&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en   Brief number: 2005-0062PESC 
12
 ―Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the ratification of the OPCAT by Azerbaijan,‖ 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/09/21&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en    Brief number: 2009-0021PESC 
13
 We first identified instances of praise by searching for the names of specific human rights agreements using the 
search function on the EU website.   We then used these briefings to train a naïve Bayes text classifier  to identify 
further examples of praise.  From these results, we hand-coded the top 100 candidate texts and used the new list of 
positive examples of praise to retrain a new classifier to get a refined list of candidate texts.  After three iterations, 
we had identified all of the examples of praise in the corpus.   
14
  We found additional examples of praise that did not meet our definition of praise-for-ratification, including praise 
for countries that abolished the death penalty (but without reference to the OPCAT), or recognition of countries that 
improved their human rights practices in some way (but without reference to a specific agreement).   
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Notably, although we did not specifically look for cases of criticism, we found many during our 
manual coding of the EU briefings.  While we found 16 briefings that contained examples of praise for 
accession to human rights agreements, we found 31 briefings that criticized states specifically for 
violating the terms of their international commitments to human rights agreements.  For example, a 2009 
briefing stated that 
The European Union condemns the recent executions by stoning in Al Shabab-controlled 
areas of Somalia, including of a woman accused of adultery…. The European Union also 
calls on all relevant parties to ensure that the practice of execution by stoning is 
effectively and permanently terminated in the country, in conformity with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Convention against 
Torture…both of which Somalia has acceded to. 
An entire subgroup of briefings is dedicated to condemning Iran’s enforcement of the death penalty for 
crimes by minors in contravention of several of its international legal commitments: 
The EU notes that these executions would be a direct contravention of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s international commitments, specifically the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, both clearly 
prohibiting the execution of minors or people who have been convicted of crimes 
committed when they were minors. 
We draw several conclusions from this analysis.  First, praise for ratification exists in the official 
communications of the European Union and this praise might offer a plausible explanation for specific 
instances of treaty ratification.  However, praise-for-ratification cannot be a general solution to the puzzle 
of human rights treaty ratification in part because large waves of ratification precede any significant 
evidence of praise by Europe.  In fact, incidents of specific praise seem to be a recent phenomenon with 
only two examples in the 1990’s, three examples from 2000-2008, and six examples in 2009 and 2010.  It 
also seems that ratification can become a two-edge sword: when the EU criticizes the human rights 
practices of particular states, it never fails to mention instances where these rights violations are in 
contravention of the offending states legal obligations to human rights agreements. 
To broaden the analysis, we considered whether the EU press releases contained evidence of 
more subtle praise for ratification in the form of increased positive sentiment toward ratifying countries.  
We measure the context in which ratifying countries are mentioned by identifying the ten words 
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immediately surrounding each direct reference to a specific country by proper name during the years 
immediately preceding and following ratification.  We then compare these words to a dictionary of term 
sentiments that codes whether 8,221 terms evoke something positive, negative, neutral, or both (Wilson, 
Wiebe, and Hoffmann 2005).  If ratifying countries are subtly praised, we might expect countries to be 
mentioned in contexts with more positive connotations in the year following ratification.  We find no 
evidence that this is the case for any of the four treaties we examine.  Countries that ratify an agreement 
experience about the same levels of positive and negative affect before and after ratification. 
Finally, we considered whether the EU press releases provide evidence that ratifying states are 
more accepted into the community of ―modern‖ states by testing whether they enjoy more diplomatic 
visits in the year following ratification relative to the year prior.  We looked for uses of the word ―visit‖ in 
the ten words surrounding a specific mention of the proper name of a particular country.
15
  We then tested 
whether countries were more likely to receive visits in the year following ratification and find that they 
are not.  For each of the four treaties we consider, the point estimate indicates a positive change in visits – 
an average increase of between 0.1 and 0.3 visits depending on the treaty – but this difference is not 
significant at the 95 percent level for any of the four treaties.  The difference does reach significance at 
the 90 percent level for the 50 countries that ratified Article 22 of the Convention against torture, perhaps 
indicating weak support for the rewards hypothesis. 
Although we think praise-for-ratification is most likely to come from the European Union, we 
also test whether the US praises countries that ratify human rights agreements.  Examining the 3,625 daily 
press briefings given by the Department of State between January 2, 1991 and December 23, 2008, we 
find that the US seems to completely ignore ratification of human rights agreements in its public 
statements.  After struggling to find any praise using automated methods, we individually read each of the 
151 briefings that mention a specific country in the two-week period surrounding its ratification of one of 
                                                 
15
 This method is crude but reasonably accurate: virtually all discussions of an official visit use the word ―visit‖ in 
the context of the name of the visited country.  To test whether ―visit‖ could refer to actions besides official visits, 
we randomly sampled and coded 100 instances of the word ―visit‖ and found that 95 percent of instances referred to 
some sort of official visit, suggesting that our measure is a reasonable proxy for the number of official visits to a 
particular country from the EU members. 
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the four treaties in our study.  The results are stark – none of the 151 briefings that mention countries in 
the two weeks surrounding ratification make any explicit mention of treaty ratification.  The only implicit 
acknowledgment of a treaty ratification is a negative reference to ―the Cuban Government…attempting to 
project an image of greater openness and willingness to cooperate with the international community on 
human rights‖ while simultaneously cracking down on human rights activists.
16
  Ratification of the CAT 
six days earlier is merely hinted at as part of Cuba’s attempt to rehabilitate its ―image‖ on human rights 
issues, and this attempt is met with criticism from the US rather than praise. 
This lack of praise is striking because the US liberally praises and criticizes the actions and 
statements of foreign countries in its press briefings.  For example, a briefing on March 11, 2002 approves 
of Mexican efforts to stop drug trafficking, but Mexican accession to the ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 just 
four days later goes unnoticed.  A briefing on March 1, 2006 praises Indonesia as ―world's third largest 
democracy,‖ with ―an active program of cooperation in counterterrorism, in democratic development, 
[and] in regional security,‖ but fails to mention that Indonesia also acceded to the ICCPR only seven days 
before.  The silence on treaty ratification is not even attributable to the unwillingness of the State 
Department to mention international law.  On the 24
th
 of July, 1991, the State Department briefing 
mentions in that Venezuela is party to ―the 1988 U.N. convention against drug trafficking,‖ in connection 
with a discussion of narcotics trafficking in Latin America, but subsequent briefings fail to mention that 
just five days later, Venezuela acceded to the CAT.   
As with the European Union, we also tested whether countries that ratified human rights 
agreements were discussed in more positive terms or received more diplomatic visits in the year 
following their ratification and found that there were no significant differences before and after 
ratification.   
Finally, we turn to the possibility that countries ratify to reduce criticism from non-state actors 
such as human rights NGOs.  To test this, we use data from Ron et al (2005) coding the number of news 
releases and background reports issued by Amnesty International criticizing a country’s human rights 
                                                 
16
   State Department Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2009.  Accessed 2009. 
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performance.  We adopt the negative binomial model used by Ron et al (2005) with the addition of two 
indicators for ratification of a treaty in the current year or the previous year. As with tangible rewards, we 
test for praise of each treaty separately although the results remain the same if we include indicators for 
all four treaties in the same model. Table 4 shows the regression results with the coefficients for the 
control variables omitted.  We find no evidence that treaty ratification mutes criticism from Amnesty 
International.  All of the coefficients are small and statistically insignificant at conventional levels and 
many of them are positive, suggesting that ratification does not reduce criticism. 
 
Outcome Variable Combined AI news releases and background reports 
    Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4 
Treaty     ICCPR        OP 1        CAT       Art. 22 
Ratification 
 
      0.022 
     (0.10) 
     -0.18 
     (0.13) 
      0.11 
     (0.08) 
      0.098 
     (0.13) 
Ratificationt-1      -0.008 
     (0.10) 
     -0.065 
     (0.12) 
      0.033 
     (0.076) 
      0.19 
     (0.12) 
     
N  1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
N of countries    150    150    150    150 
Random effects?    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Controls  Political terror scale, Polity IV scores, presence of armed conflict, percent 
of population directly killed in armed conflict, GDP, military personnel, 
population, US military aid, foreign aid (ODA), and average media 
coverage.  See Ron et al (CITE) for details. 
 
Table 4:  Negative binomial regression of the number of Amnesty International news releases on 
background reports, regressed on treaty ratification and a set of controls with country random effects.   
 
 
V.  Conclusion: Domestic Politics as an Alternative Lens for Understanding Ratification 
The legal regime for international human rights has been one of the three main pillars of 
international order of the past half century.  Alongside the Security Council dedicated to peace and 
security and the GATT/WTO dedicated to trade liberalization, the complex of international human rights 
treaties has been a central institution of the post-World War II order, and has become even more crucial in 
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the post-cold war period (Simmons 2009).  It is beyond the scope of this paper fully to address how and 
why this order was constructed.  Rather, what we have tried to elucidate is that the politics of joining 
some of the most important agreements in this regime has been misunderstood.  The notion that states 
have been induced to join such normatively important pacts as the ICCPR and the CAT hoping to receive 
external rewards from a core of wealthy, democratic countries simply does not bear empirical scrutiny. 
Our findings do not lend substantial support to claims that states ratify human rights treaties in hopes of 
attracting tangible rewards in the form of international aid, trade, and foreign direct investment, or 
intangible rewards such as praise and acceptance into the club of ―responsible‖ countries.  At best, we 
find minimal evidence of aid rewards from European states for ratification of several agreements, but 
these rewards hardly scale up to aggregate increases in aid. Furthermore, qualitative inquiries suggest that 
treaty ratification is unrelated to European aid policies and programs.  We find that in general trade and 
FDI are unresponsive to treaty ratification and in some cases, ratification is followed by decreased trade.   
Even more importantly, there is precious little evidence that states receive intangible rewards for 
human rights treaty ratification.  Evidence of praise from the EU is extremely weak at best, while the US 
State Department utterly ignores treaty ratification in its public statements.  This might not surprise those 
who view the United States as largely aloof from the international legal regime for human rights (Ignatieff 
2005), but it is in stark contrast to theories of ratification that emphasize social ―acceptance‖ as the major 
driver for treaty participation.  Not even the major human rights non-governmental organization, Amnesty 
International, has much positive to say when states ratify human rights treaties.  The idea that acceptance 
into a circle of modern statehood can explain ratification is not even supported by an uptick in state visits, 
which is one of the most important visible displays of peer acceptance.  
These null findings are of significant theoretical importance.  For states outside of the European 
and North American ―core,‖ participation in the global human rights regime has been portrayed as largely 
externally induced.  This may be the natural result of a research agenda that has been propelled largely by 
scholars from ―core‖ countries, or it may be the default setting given a general lack of research and 
knowledge about how non-western countries think about international law.  In any case, given these 
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findings, we believe that approaches focusing on domestic politics will be far more fruitful for 
understanding motives behind treaty ratification. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop and 
present a full theory of treaty ratification, but we would point to several approaches that we think deserve 
more careful empirical attention.  Moravscik, for example, has pioneered one of the most compelling 
arguments for states to ratify treaties, especially European conventions with teeth: they are actually useful 
in domestic politics to help sustain democratic momentum and lock in fairly recent rights gains 
(Moravcsik 2000).  While broader support for the lock-in thesis is not especially strong (Cole 2005; 
Hawkins and Goodliffe 2006), we do think that the explanation for why governments commit to 
international human rights treaties is likely to be domestic rather than foreign.  The ―spiral model‖ 
developed by constructivists Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) conceives of ratification as a tactical 
concession to rights proponents at both the domestic and international levels.  Simmons found some 
evidence that governments in autocratic states have tended to ratify the ICCPR late in their office-holding, 
which seems to imply short term domestic reasons to ratify, as Pinochet’s ratification of the CAT within 
months of the first democratic election of his tenure suggests (Simmons 2009).  Some rationalists such as 
Vreeland (2008) argue that governments sometimes see ratification as a small concession to their 
domestic political opponents, while others such as Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011) think treaty ratification 
is a signal to domestic opponents that officials are willing to torture, despite such commitments.  We 
think much more purchase on the politics of human rights treaty ratification will be realized by looking at 
the strategies and tactics governments employ domestically to keep a grip on their rule. 
It is also important to acknowledge that not all external motivations for committing to human 
rights treaties are reward-seeking.  Clearly a good number of states ratify human rights treaties because 
they want to set a positive example for others.  This is routinely the explanation offered for some of the 
rights leaders (Landman 2005; Simmons 2009); it is even the argument heard within the United States 
among treaty proponents who do not prevail (Halberstam 1999).  Without losing a critical perspective, a 
little less cynicism might serve in uncovering motives states have to commit to international human rights 
standards in a public and unequivocal fashion.  We have only scratched the surface, but so far the 
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evidence that states ratify human rights agreements for external rewards – tangible or intangible – appears 
weak indeed.  
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